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ADVOCACY AND ASSOCIATION 
 
John D. Inazu* 
 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) 1  is riddled with factual, 
procedural, and legal complexities. The litigation spanned twelve years. 2  The 
plaintiffs were a mixture of individuals and groups. The constitutional claims and 
the government interests were weighty.3 The meaning and scope of the “material 
support” statute were highly contested.4 But this much is clear: the United States 
government believed that in some circumstances a lawyer who filed an amicus 
brief on behalf of a client would be subject to criminal liability under the material 
support provision.5 At the same time, the government and the Supreme Court were 
quick to emphasize that mere membership in one of these groups was not 
prohibited under the statute, for that would have violated the right of association.6 
So the freedom of association protects the right of a lawyer to join a group, but not 
to engage in legal advocacy on behalf of that group. 
Margaret Tarkington’s Freedom of Attorney-Client Association exposes the 
constitutional reasoning that leads to these counterintuitive conclusions.7  More 
importantly, Professor Tarkington shows us why it matters, and why we would be 
wise to alter course. Rather than simply postulating yet another variant of the right 
of association,8 she ably demonstrates why protections for our ability to form 
relationships and foster ideas are indispensable predicates to other First 
Amendment freedoms but not reducible to only those freedoms.9 
																																																								
* © 2013 John D. Inazu, Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, 
Washington University. 
1 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
2 Id. at 2716. 
3 See id. at 2722–24. 
4 See id. at 2724–25. 
5 Id. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Government’s claim that the ban 
here, so supported, prohibits a lawyer hired by a designated group from filing on behalf of 
that group an amicus brief before the United Nations or even before this Court” 
underscores the problem with banning advocacy on the theory that such advocacy 
legitimizes the group’s conduct). 
6  Id. at 2718 (majority opinion) (“Section 2339B does not criminalize mere 
membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization. It instead prohibits providing 
‘material support’ to such a group.”). 
7  Margaret Tarkington, Freedom of Attorney-Client Association, 2012 UTAH L.  
REV. 1071. 
8 See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (referring to a 
right of “political association”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18, 622 (1984) 
(establishing the rights of intimate and expressive association). 
9  Although I will not belabor the point here, I think that Professor Tarkington’s 
reliance on De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 
(1945), illustrates the ways in which both the general right of association and the more 
specific application of attorney-client association are traceable to, and derivative of, the 
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As Professor Tarkington notes, HLP’s odd elevation of bare membership over 
an activity like legal advocacy illustrates the kind of results-oriented formalism 
that plagues current First Amendment approaches to the rights of speech and 
association.10 That formalism misses in two directions: (1) by conflating the two 
rights and the values they represent; and (2) by ignoring the ways in which those 
rights complement and reinforce one another. The Court’s decision in Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez 11  illustrates the first kind of formalism. 12  Professor 
Tarkington highlights how HLP illustrates the second: 
 
[T]he Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs’ free speech rights 
were not abridged because they were still free to “say anything they wish 
on any topic” and “may speak and write freely” about their concerns 
regarding their proposed clients. As characterized by the Court, the 
plaintiff attorneys were forbidden from engaging in “only a narrow 
category of speech”—namely, “speech to, under the direction of, or in 
coordination with” their desired clientele. In so holding, the Court 
interpreted the right of free speech separately from the right of 
association. Having endowed the attorneys with speech, but denied them 
the ability to speak in association with those who needed to hear what 
they had to say, the Court went on to find, in a very cursory passage, that 
there also was no violation of the plaintiffs’ right of association.13 
 
The result is striking: “By separating speech and association, the court 
undermined both rights.”14 And, as Professor Tarkington notes, in the context of 
attorney-client association: “The idea that attorney free speech rights are preserved 
by allowing attorneys to engage in ‘independent advocacy,’ but prohibiting 
associated advocacy is absurd.”15  
None of the preceding commentary means that HLP’s holding is necessarily 
wrong. The state also has important interests, and none weightier than its own 
national security. Chief Justice Roberts rightly acknowledges that “[e]veryone 
agrees that the Government’s interest in combatting terrorism is an urgent 
																																																																																																																																												
First Amendment’s right of assembly. See, e.g., Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1084 n.74 and 
1103 n.180. For a more detailed explanation, see JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE 
FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012). 
10 See Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1100. See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational 
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011). 
11 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
12 Id. at 2985 (concluding that the petitioner’s “expressive-association and free-speech 
arguments merge . . . .”). For my critique of this conflation in Martinez, see John D. Inazu, 
Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1213, 1233–34 (2012). 
13 Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1082 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1080. 
14 Id. at 1082. Cf. id. (“Considered in combination, the HLP Court’s ruling on free 
speech and free association works to deny the core attributes of each right.”). 
15 Id. at 1084. 
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objective of the highest order.”16 And that objective is facilitated by appropriate 
law enforcement activities and the use of criminal law, including criminal 
conspiracy law. Although these kinds of tools are not impervious to abuse, the 
activity they target is an appropriate focus of potential restrictions. Lawyers 
advocating on behalf of clients are not. 
Professor Tarkington and I share similar worries about the reasoning and 
rhetoric of HLP. I am less persuaded by—or at least more cautious about—the 
theoretical arguments that she advances to ground the idea of attorney-client 
association. I will focus on two of them: the instrumental argument and the 
democratic argument.17 
Professor Tarkington’s instrumental argument is that the right of association 
“is essential to secure the other rights expressly guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”18 Her reasoning resembles the Supreme Court’s explanation for the 
right of “expressive association” first announced in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees.19 The problem with this analytical move is that its instrumental focus 
converts a foundational right into a derivative one. 20  Our freedom to form 
relationships and groups stands on its own without the need to harness it for the 
advancement of other First Amendment freedoms. 
Professor Tarkington’s second theoretical focus is the democratic argument: 
the First Amendment’s freedoms “work together to preserve the American form of 
government.”21 I do not disagree with this normative impulse or its connection to 
the sources that Professor Tarkington enlists. But I worry that the focus on 
preserving “the American form of government” risks morphing a protection 
against government into a defense of government. 
What, then, is the reason for protecting this idea of attorney-client 
association? Professor Tarkington gestures toward what I believe is the best 
answer when she discusses Vincent Blasi’s checking theory of the First 
Amendment.22 I think, however, that a more powerful argument draws from an 
even deeper suspicion of state power, one that jealously guards the tools and 
resources available to us to push back against that power. Like lawyers who argue 
on behalf of clients. 
In my view, one of Professor Tarkington’s most important insights is the 
connection that she draws between legal advocacy and attorney-client association. 
As she writes: “Legal advocacy is associated advocacy.”23 This nice turn-of-phrase 
																																																								
16 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010). 
17 Professor Tarkington’s third argument—that guilt is personal—is both interesting 
and plausible but has less to do with the kinds of associational observations that I  
offer here. 
18 Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1077. 
19 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see id. at 622. 
20 See INAZU, supra note 9, at 127, 140–41. 
21 Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1090. 
22 Id. at 1091 (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 
1977 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 521 (1977)). 
23 Tarkington, supra note 7, at 1084. 
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underscores one of the ways in which informal politics precedes formal politics. 
The lawyer as advocate (who files briefs and delivers arguments) flows out of the 
lawyer as counselor (who listens to clients, shapes arguments, and forms 
relationships). In this sense, Professor Tarkington’s focus on attorney-client 
association mirrors the ways in which many groups function as the pre-political 
spaces in which ideas and relationships are formed in the first place. It is not 
enough for us to focus on the moment of expression (or the moment of advocacy) 
because we will never arrive at these moments without sufficient protection for the 
background circumstances in which they are crafted.24 That to me is the core 
reason that we must be vigilant to protect the groups out of which ideas and 
advocacy emerge. These protections are not absolute—we will rightly worry about 
and constrain criminal activity, threats of violence, and improper uses of power. 
But in policing those lines, we should be cognizant of the state’s ability to 
encroach too deeply, to describe too uncharitably, and to control too rigidly. In this 
sense, HLP’s rhetoric may be more dangerous than its holding. Professor 
Tarkington has helped us see why this is the case. 
																																																								
24 See INAZU, supra note 9, at 5. 
